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B's service for one year. B refuses to do the work. A can 
get judgment for the value of the service 'promised less the 
value of the land retained by him." In the present action, 
the respondent has retained the gravel from which the con-
sideration for the appellants' covenant to mine was to be, 
obtained, and is allowed to recover the full. value of the serv~ 
ices agreed to be rendered. 
And the rule of damages applied by a majority of the 
court is that upon proof of the breach of the contract, the 
mine owner at least established a prima facie case entitling 
him to a judgment for the full amount of the royalty. This 
is, in effect, saying that if the owner of an automobile agreed 
to sell it fora stated amount, upon breach of the contract 
by the buyer he may sue for the consideration and in the 
absence of any evidence of value by the defendant, be en-
titled to retain his automobile and have judgment for the 
sale price. Such a' doctrine is contrary to the e~ementary 
principle that in an action for damages, where the tItle to the 
subject matter remains in the vendor, the measure of re~ 
covery is the difference between the contract price and the 
value of what is retained, and it is a part of the plaintiff's 
case to establish both factors from which the difference may 
be computed. (Boyles v. Kingsbaker Bros. Co., 5 Cal.2d 68 
[53 P.2d 141]; Coburn v. California Portland Cement Co., 
144 Cal. 81 [77 P. 771] ; San Francisco Milling Co., Ltd. v. 
Frye & Co., 2 Cal.App.2d 563 [38 P.2d 165] ; Bonan :. Pa-
cific Orient Co., 140 Cal.App. 68 [34 P.2d 1064]; ihmo v. 
Mitchell, 124 Cal.App. 497 r12 P.2d 101}!)1 : Hougland v. Roth 
Blum Packing Co., 99 Cal.App. 631 [279 P. 159]; Nye & 
Nissen v. Weed Lumber Co., 92 Cal.App. 598 [268 P. 659] ; 
Gopcevic v. California Packing Corp., 64 Cal.App. 132 [220 
P. 1078] ; Meyer v. McAllister, 24 Cal.App. 16 [140 P. 42] ; 
Cuthill v. Peabody. 19 Cal.App. 304 [125 P. 926]; and see 
22 Cal.Jur., p. 1062, sec. 121.) 
But even were the rule announced by the majority opinion 
correct, its conclusion still may not be justified by the facts 
of the case, for the uncontradicted evidence in' the rec~rd 
shows that the gravel could be mined at a cost of 30. cents per 
cubic yard, thus yielding a profit of 20 cents per cubic yard. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied November 
4, 1943. Edmonds, .T., voted for a rehearing. 
b74z~5o 
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[So F. No. 16763. In Bank. Oct. 6. 1943.] 
WILLIAM J. CITRON, Responoent, ".J. J. FR,ANKLIN. 
Appellant , r; 
[1] Corporations-Transfers of Stock-Sales-Option-Constmd) 
tion.-In a contract granting a purchasing agenta:n })ptio~ to 
purchase 25 per cent of the optionor's corporate stock and., 
pI'Oviding that if the optionor sold his stock" to'o.therS prior 
to exercise of the option, the optionor would pay the optionee 
10 per cent of the amount received on such sale'tlverand 
above the amount which the optionor had, pai~ }ntf? the cor~ 
poration, the parties intended that the optionee' was i iobe . 
entitled to the benefit of the 10 per cent provision,immediately: 
upon sale to others at any ti~' ~ during the option, and the 
optionee was not required, to exercise his option, after the 
optionor had sold all of the stock to others; 
[2] Evidence--Extrinsic Evidence-Options.-It ,·was 'proper 1;0 
sustain objections to questions relating to the optlonee's under-
standing as to the proportion of the proceeds that he was 
entitled to receive from a sale of corporate stock covered by 
a written option agreement, where such. questions had no bear-
ing on the issue whether the optionee was required to exercise' 
the option, and where they were directed, not to the interpre~ 
tation that the parties placed on the contract, but simply to 
the subjective. understanding of one party. ' 
[8] . Corporations-Transfers of Stock-Sale~Options-Exten­
sion of Time.-Where a contract grantlng a purchasing agent 
an option to purchase corporate stock provided that the price 
should be computed upon the amount which the optionor ha(l 
paid into the corporation, but stittedno method by,.which. the 
optionee could determine that amount, the "optio~;!iDipliedly" 
required the optionor to furnish the optionee ,with' accurate, 
information concerning that amount whehirJerthe. optioti.~~~ . 
expressed a desire to exercise' the option; ana •.. anY" delay i iii i 
furnishing such information would extend theoption"untU:k' 
reasonable time after such information had been gi:ven';Ifno 
accurate information was ever given, though, ,the," 6ptionec:t. 
made timely requests therefor, the option was .'extended,to; 
the time of the sale of the stock to third pers0Il:~' r ,,: ' 
McK. Dig. References: [1,3] Corporati6ns, § 3d5~.'1~tEvidende7i . § 348. ' . '; ii' ;,;~ " ,:.;\,z 
:; 
i : j I 
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APPEAL from a judgment of the' Superior Court of the 
City and (Jounty of San Francisco. Elmer E. Robinson, 
JUdge. Affirmed. 
Action to recover upon a contract granting an, option to 
purchase a designated percentage of the stock of a corpora-
tion. Judgment for plaintiff affirmed. 
B. E. Kragen, George Olshausen, Lionel B. Benas and Keyes 
& Erskine for AppeUant. h 
Clarence A. Linn for Respondent. 
THE COURT.-:-A petition for hearing in this case was 
granted to the end that, further consideration be given to the 
contentions of the appellant. On such consideration we agree 
with the disposition of the appeal by the District Court of 
Appeal of the First AppeUate District, Division Two, and 
adopt as the opirii(ln of this court the opinion of that court 
prepared by Justice Spence, with the modifications that here· 
inafter appear. 
"Plaintiff sought to recover upon It contract. The cause 
was tried by the court sitting without a jury and plaintiff 
had judgment against defendantJ. J. Franklin in the sum' of 
$2646.33." Defendant appeals from the judgment. 
"Plaintiff had been engaged for many-years in purchasing 
and booking motion pictures for use in the Hawaiian Islands. 
Defendant' had been engllged for many years in exhibiting 
motion pictures. In 1934, defendant conceived the idea of 
organizing a corporation 'in the Hawaiian Islands and of 
forming a chain, of motion picture tteatres there together 
with a film exchange. In pursuance of this idea, defendant 
negotiated with plaintiff and, as a result of the negotiations, 
two written contracts were entered into on the same day, 
July 20, 1934. 
"One of said contracts, attached to the complaint as Ex-
hibit B, purported to be entered into between plaintiff and 
the corporation which had not th6n been organized. It was 
called a 'Purchasing Agency Agreement' and plaintiff' was 
thereby employed by the corporation to actas its purchasing 
agent. It further provided that plaintiff should be elected 
vice-president of the corporation 'as soon as' same may be 
conveniently done.' 
Oct. 1943] CITRON v. FRANKLIN 
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"The other of said contracts, attached to the complaint, as 
Exhibit A, was entered into by plaintiff and defend~t per-
sonally. This is the contract upon which the present'acti?n 
was based. It recited that defendant was the owner.'bf 'a1! 
the stock of the corporation,' that plaintiff was the purchasing 
agent thereof and that defendant desired to grant'plaintiff 
the option to purchase 25 per cent of all the stock .own~d ~y 
defendant. It was then agreed as follows: ' .,' 
" '1. That first party does hereby givean~,'gt;alit'll~~? 
second party an option to purchase not' n;tore ,th.an' ~:w~n~?,':~ 
five per cent (25 %) of all the stock oWl":l:ed: ~ii~ .. ~~~H:,bY)}~~~ 
party in the Franklin Theatres EnterprIses,Ih~~, '8:, cRrpor~-
• \. . -il:" . f;:. ':";,.:ff;'o(t'Unu it{"· 
tIO'~·'2. That the purchase price to' ber paidby)r~~cbna.;:~~flY 
upon the exercise of the aforesaid'opH~nshal~;:~e"~O#~1:!-r~~ 
upon the amount of money or other cOllslderatIOnwhlcli,:ftr.,s,-t 
party has advanced and paid into thesaidcorpo~a~io~. ~:p~~ 
the date that the said option shall be' exercised. : ," ',"',: 
" '3. It is distinctly understood and'a.greed tliat: th~:afor~:' 
said option shall remain in ~orcefor : a', 'pe~iod' 'O'f, : O~~Y~~r: 
from the date of the executIOn of th~ 'agreement, It, bem~ 
understood in this respect, however, thai first pa~ty shaIi);n 
no way be precluded from selling or disposing of the said 
stock to persons other than second party, provided, howeve,r, 
that second party shall share, the proceedS from the sltle 6~ 
said stock as is provided hereafter. ',' , ' " , ,', " ',! 
" '4. It is distinctly understood that in the" eVEm~ first 
party shall sell his stock in the aforesa~d corporation to ~ny 
one other than second party prior to tIle, exercise by secq~~ 
party of his option, then and in that 'event, ftrs~ pa~y ,agr,e,~~ 
to pay unto second party ten per cent (10%)' of all, mo~es 
and other consideration realized by first partyover and above 
the amount of money and other consideration which first 
party has paid for the aforesaid stock or has advanced to 
thc said corporation.' ' 
, 'After entering into these contracts, defendant went to 
the islands and acted as the head of the new venture while 
plaintiff remained on the mainland and acted as purchasing 
agent. The corporation was formed, it prospered and defen· 
dant finally sold his stock on May 31, 1937, before plaintifl 
had exercised his option to purchase tht: stock but during thE 
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ex.tended time for the exercise· of the option as found by the 
trIal court. . 
. "There was. but little conflict in thtl evidence. Such con. 
flICt as there was .relating to the sale price of the stock and the 
amount which defendant had paid into the corporation was re~olved by the trial court in favor of defendant. The sale 
prIce was found to be $30,000 and the amount paid in by def~n~an~ was found to be $3536.61. The trial court gave 
plaIntIff Judgment for 10 per cent of tne difference between 
these amounts. On this appeal the findIngs concerning these 
amounts are not challenged. 
. ~1] "Defendant first contends that the trial court erred 
In Imposing any liability upon him as the trial court found 
that plaintiff never exercised his option. The trial court 
fou:r:d, however, th~t the option had been extended from time 
to tIme up to, and Including the time of the sale on May 31 
1937 .. AssumIng fo~ the moment that this latter finding w~~ 
sustaIn~d by the ~vIdence, we find no merit' in defendant's 
con.tentIOn. The Intent ~nd purpose of the parties appears 
entIrely clear and unambIguous from a rea.ding of the option' 
a~reement.. Plaintiff desired and the a.greement granted to :. 
hIm an optIOn to purchase 25 per cent 0"" all stock owned by 
defendant. ~efendant ?~sired to retain and the agreement 
reserved to hI~ the prIVIlege of selling all of his stock to 
others at any tIme. The agreement then provided that in the 
event defendant sold his stock to others 'prior to exercise. 
b.y second party of his option,.' defendant would pay to plain. 
tiff 10 per cent of the amount received on such sale over and ab~ve the a.niount which defendant had paid into the corpo. 
ratIon .. It IS apparently defendant's :llaIm that plaintiff was 
not entIt!ed to the benefit of the last mentioned provision 
upon. the sale of t~e stock but only in the event that plaintiff 
exerCIsed the optIOn after the sale tad taken place H 
s~resses. th,e words .' prior to the exercise by· second pa~ty o~ 
hIS OptIO~ a:r:d claIms that those words cannot be construed 
to mean durIng the life of the option.' In other words de. 
fendant urges ~. construction under whichplaintiffw~uld 
?ave ?een ~eqUlred togo through the formality of exercis. 
Ing hIS optIon to purchase . the stock after defendant had 
sold all of his stock to others and at a time when defen. 
dant was no lon~er ~n a position to sell any stock to plaintiff. 
Such a constructIOn IS wholly unreasonable. '1;'he law does 'not 
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require idle acts (Civ. Code, sec. 35?2 )~nd 'the clear 1D:~~~ •. 
tion of the parties, as evidenced by the termso~t~eagr~~ •. 
ment, was that plaintiff was to be entit~ed' tothe·benefit.of. 
the 10 per cent provision immediately uponthe sale to others 
at any time during the life of the option." . . '. .' . 
. [2] Defendant also contends that the co~rt ~ erroneously 
sustained objections to questions put to plaIntiff on. cross· 
examination, claiming that defendant was thusp!evented. 
from proving that plaintiff understood that. h~ ha~ to a.c. 
cept his option as a condition precedent to ClaImIng rIghts In 
the proceeds from the sale. Objections were sustained to the 
first and third of the following questions: "You understand, 
Mr. Citron, that you were to receive ten percent .. of Mr., Frank. 
lin's net profit upon the sale of stock. he held in this co:~ 
poration Y" "You knew, did you not, that.Mr.Frankl~n 
sold 62% per cent of his stock to Mr. Rosen Y" "Whatdid 
you 'understand you were to receive fr0n:! the balan.ce of the 
37% per cent under your agreement!" These q~estIons .we~e 
concerned with the proportion of the' proceeds that plaIntiff 
understood he was entitled to recei"Ve under the' contract and 
had no . bearing on the' issue whether plaintiff was require~ 
to exercise the option. In' any event, they were directed,. not 
to the interpretation that the parties placed upon the con· 
tract, but simply to the subjective understanding of one of 
the parties. (Brant v. Oalifornia Daities. Inc., 4 Ca1.2d 128, 
133 [48 P.2d 13].) . 
[3] .' i Defendant further contends that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the trial court's finding 'That the term,s 
of said agreement, Exhibit A, were. ex~ended from tim~ ,to 
time and up to and including thedatt: of which defendant, 
J. J. Franklin, sold all of his capital I:!tock in the Franklin 
Theatrical Enterprises, Ltd., to Adolph Ramish, to wit:. May 
311937.' The evidence on this issue is quite voluminousan4 
inciludes both letters and conversations .. Neither the Writin~ 
of the letters nor the making of the (.Ira: statements was de' .. 
nied by defendant. We need refer only to someportion,s 
of these letters' and statements. 
"The written agreement was made c.c July 20, 1934, arid, 
by its terms, the option was to remain h ... force foro~e year. 
After executing the agreement, defendant· spent mostof'his 
time in the islands while. plaintiff spent most of his timeo:b. 
the mainland. At an early date, two men, Ramish· and RoS~, 
; t 
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had also become financially interested In the venture, Mr. 
Ramish being made president and Mr. Rosen a vice-president 
of the corporation. On May 23, 1935, and before the expira-
tion of the one year, plaintiff wrote to defendant, 'I in-
formed him (Rosen) I was ready tc put rrp my end of it and 
I presume either you or he will call Jlj me shortly to cover 
my 25% interest. Am glad everythiug is going along fine. 
Feel confident the four of us will be on the easy side of the 
street. ' On May 31, 1935, defendant replied: 'Regarding 
your interest you need not worry about that in the ieast. 
Whenever you are ready, you will make the deal with me 
as I suppose you know that my word IS as good as a bond 
even if you didn't have a contract. . .. We all of course, 
are directors. I am glad that you realize that we are on the 
way and that we are almost reaching chI:' goal we set out to 
reach. I am not forgetting for one moment, regardless of 
what you say I accomplished, the fine work that you did and 
without which I could not have accomplished what we did so 
far. A company with four men with experience that we have 
had must go places. We have everythmg in our favor.' 
"On June 6, 1935, plaintiff I!.gainwrote defendant: 'You 
may be assured that I have the _tmost confidence in what 
you say and when you come to the mainland we can arrange 
t.tll matters pertaining to my interest witt the company.' On 
July 5, 1935, defendant wrote plaintiff, '1 have been held up 
here because of the many changes that we have had to make 
in the plans of the King .Theatre but hope to get away very 
shortly and then we will be able to get together with you 
on your contract. . .. I cannot forget your loyalty through-
out the storm, and I want to say to you that I am happy 
to have you as one of my partners.' 
"Defendant did not come to the mainland as soon as ex-
pected and on September 25, 1935, he wrote plaintiff: 'As I 
told youin previous correspondence that my word is as good 
as any bond and that I would live up to my agreement with 
you ... .' On November 7, 1935, plaintiff wrote defendant: 
'I would like to know what amount of ;rour stock and interest 
you would want me to take and just what it would cost me 
in round numbers 1 Of course, you know that I am nota 
man of means and have very little casn that I can place my 
fingers on.' On November 14, 1935, defendant wrote plain-
tiff: 'Regarding the stock, whcn you are out here (Honolulu) 
we will discuss that matter further. We had an understand-
Oct. 1943] CITRON v. FRANKLIN' 
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ing and when you come here we will discuss it further. When 
you see what we have here you will realize the op~ort~i.ty.' 
"In December 1935, plaintiff, R.osen and RamlSh vlSlted, 
Honolulu and conferred with defendant. Plaintiff's testi-
mony of the conversations then held cmd subsequently held 
concerning the option was corrobora.ted by Rosen and was 
not denied by defendant. Plaintiff said, 'How about my end 
of it 1 I want to take up my option.' Defendant said, 'We 
are too busy. I can't talk now. You don"t have to worry~: 
My word is my bond. You can come in any time you wanq, 
When plaintiff asked for the information concerning the. 
amount defendant had invested, defendant told him that. h~. 
was 'very; very busy,' that it was the 'wrong/time,' to talk; 
about it but that he would give him the information in the. 
'very near future.' ; ,:'.' ",'ii, 
"In 1936, defendant came to the. mainland and conferr~d'; 
with plaintiff, Rosen and Ramish. The subject of the option-: 
was again discusse.d .. It will be. remembered that the _Un~ij 
challenged finding of the trial court .shows . that defendant ( 
had paid into the corporation only $3536;61: In their .convel'~< 
sations, plaintiff said: 'Jack,. now that you are here from 
Honolulu I want to know definitely how much I.am to put., 
, . h .. t 
up for my option of twenty-five per cent. Tell mew at 1t·lS.,;: 
Defendant said 'Listen, I put up $42,000 of my own money. ~, 
Both plaintiff and Rosen took exception to this figure, plain-
tiff saying it was 'ridiculous' and Rosen saying 'You haven't.: 
got that kind of money.' Plaintiff asked defendantfol',a; 
statement of the amounts advanced butdejendant.'put it off'· 
saying, 'I am too busy. I have to goqack to,.theislands.' ".: 
"The correspondence continued aftel"; d~f~ndant's !return) 
to the islands but the tone of the letters; graduallybecame.i 
less cordial. On October 16, 1936, defendant ,:wrote to Jllain;1~ 
tiff 'Consolidated are now very anxious to make: a deal :a16ng~: 
the' lines we discussed' and if our partners. will not be think:if 
ing. only of themselves we will come out with flying colors.:; 
Everything points to succe~.' On the same day, plaintiff, 
wrote to defendant: 'As you must know, ,had you given me, 
the exact amount you put into the theatre project, as now' 
appears on the books of the company, I certainly would have, 
handed you my check and I feel eonfident I could have put 
over a deal you now have in mind, ,You have alwaysinformed: 
me that you had invested. At one time yoe told me $32,000, 
I , 
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at another tim.e $40,OOO~,Both Mr~ R~niish and Mr. Rosen 
on: several occa,sions; informed me that vou had been credited, 
with $15,000 o~ t~e company's books. • So you see, Jack; my 
reason for hesItatm~. You assured me many times that I 
could come in any time I desired. Tb.at your word with me 
was always, good and that whenever I was ready I could 
come in., I have' always been ready bu" the above held me 
back.' 
"Defendant replied on November 11. 1936: '.As to what 
Ramish says J' have invested, he can say what he likes the 
books will show I invested over $41,000.00 and not $15,000.00 
as he, says~ The ~tatement I gave you some time ago was 
made out by Mr. Turner, in that one it was $32,000.00, but 
I have since shown that it is $41,000.00,' On December 14 
1936, defendant again wrote: "Regardinr Mr. Ramish's state:, 
ment of what I iiivested, it does not interest me in the least 
for it is contemptible falsehood. I showed you my invest-
ment, made up by Mr. Turner, from my invoices. Since thEm 
other invoices were given to Mr. Turner which made it $42 000 . 
but that is neith?rhere nor there. Our deal was not p~edi: 
cated ~n what I mv:ested. You have certainly had every op-
por~umty to come. m .b~t' so far you never took advantage 
of It. It would be rIdIculous to base the business on the 
amount of money Mr. Ramish suggests My books speak for 
themselves. ' 
"On January 5, 1937, defendant wrote: 'I always told 
you I would take care of you, meaning that you would not 
have to take up your stock according, to the time limit in 
your contract, but if we, should sell the business and you 
have not taken up your stock by that time you certainly 
couldn't expect me to close with you at such time ... ' you 
~ave the same opportunitytodsy that you had when we 
sIgned ~he co~tract, but it must be exercised before a sale of 
the busmess IS made, otherwise same will not be recognized 
b'y me.' Plaintiff replied on January 25, 1937: 'For a long 
tIme past, Jack, r have been willing and anxious to take up 
the option according to our agreement. I asked you for a 
statement of the amount invested by you so that I would know 
the ~mount of my prorata, but was unable to get a clear 
defimte statement. If you will give mEl an exact statement 
of the am~unt invested in the company by you, I will act 
on the optIon as SOon as I can verify your statement. As 
O~t.1943] CITRON tI. FRANKLIN 
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you know, I ,have not access to the bockS andrttti.\iSt:tiep~~ 
on the officers of the company to furnj'3hme'the.figures~' 
Defendant replied to this letter on February ,3:1937: 'm: 
garding the stock again I don't know how' I could ,make my.: 
self clearer than I have in my last letter;'no one iri the wOrld 
could ever accuse me of ever taking advantage of anyone'6r 
ever breaking my word. Ramishand Rosen 'ha:venothing 
whatsoever to do with our transaction andaga.i:rl:let me' lid~ 
vise you that I do not care what either of them s,ay 1 ihv~ed; 
because whatever they say in this respect is "not \ 'the' facts: 
However, what I invested in the business has'nothing what-' 
ever to do with our contract, but let me again remind you: 
that I handed you a statement madeoutby"Mr, Turner while 
he was inL. A. of all expenditures I had made and that 
amounted to $38,000.00. I again explained to "you that! 
gave them additional $8000.00 worth of bills when Turner 
came to Honolulu, but in a thousand years, you, nor anyone 
else, will be able to make out his books the way he has the~ 
setup now ... , How then, can you ever expect to get any 
proper figures even if you should want them from him. As 
- per the contract which I made with you, which stated that 
you could come in on twenty-five per cent of-my holdings, 
none can say that you have offered to take up your option and 
that I refused it, but circumstances occur where options 
cannot last forever, because of certain conditions." Therefore; 
I again say that although your option ran out, you can take 
advantage of the opportunity providing-you take-ft immedi. 
ately,otherwise you cannot expect me to feel any further 
obligation in the matter as I have been more than' : fair 'in 
this entire transaction. You realize that a sale of the business 
may be made any day or a deal :may be made that requires 
quick action and unless you have made your investment 
before that time, you can't expect me to hold up deals as that 
is asking too much.' On February 18, 1937, plaintiff replied: 
'Note what you say regarding the -Option. Just as soon as) 
can get the necessary data beassl1red Jack I want to take 
advantage of the option you have extended me.' 
"Defendant apparently concedes, at ieast for the purpose 
of argument, .that the time for the' exercise of the option- wlis 
extended but claims that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the finding' that, the time was extended to arid Ui. 
cluding the time of the sale on May 31, 1937. It is argued 
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that the extension was for an unspecified time, that it there-
fore covered only a reasonable time and that a reasonable 
time expired prior to May 31, 1937. Defendant further ar-
gues under a separate heading that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to support the finding that the extension was based 
upon a good and sufficient consideration. Plaintiff argues 
that the time provision for the exercise of the option was 
waived by both written and oral agreements for extensions 
based upon good and sufficient consideration and that de-
fendant, by his fraudulent conduct, prevented the exercise 
of the option and was estopped. In the reply brief, defendant 
argues that as neither prevention of performance nor estop-
pel was pleaded, plaintiff may not rely thereon. 
"As we view the situation, many of these contentions need 
not be considered here for the reasons tereinafter stated. The 
action was one upon an option agreement which was ~dmit­
tedly made upon a good and sufficient consideration. It was 
executed contemporaneously with an d.greement for the em-
ployment of plaintiff by the corporatIon as its purchasing 
agent. Plaintiff served in that capacit~, with the corporation 
until the time of the sale and continued to serve. thereafter. 
The option agreement provided that the option price should 
be computed upon the amount which defendant had paid into 
the corporation. No method was provided by the express 
terms of the agreement to enable plaintiff to. determine the 
amount which defendant had so paid. We therefore believe 
it necessary, in order to make the agreement reaso~able, to 
read into the agreement the implied terms that defendant 
would furnish plaintiff with. accurate bformation concerning 
that amount at any time that plaintiff expressed his desirc 
to exercise said option during the life thereof and that any 
delay on the part of the defendant in furnishing such in-
formation would extend the life of the vption until a reason-
able time after such information had been furnished by de-
fendant. (Civ. Code, sec. 1655.) If these terms were not 
implied terms of the agreement, then plaintiff would have 
had no way of determining (1) whether it was desirable to 
exercise the option or (2) the amount to be tendered to de-
fenda,nt ~n the exercise thereof. 
"Under the express' terms of the option agreement the 
life of the option was from July 20,.1934, to JUly 20, 1935. 
The evidence shows that :plaintiff expressed his desire to exer-
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cise the option as early as May 23, 1935, in a letter written 
to defendant on that date. Thereafter plaintiff reaffirmed 
his desire to exercise the option on numerous occasions and 
made repeated requests to defendant to furnish him with the 
necessary information. No accurate information was fur-
nished to plaintiff by defendant at any time. For some pe-
riod of time after May 23, 1935, and despite repeated requests 
by plaintiff, defendant gave no information whatever concern-
ing the amount but gave plaintiff the broadest assurances 
that his option could be exercised at any time. Thereafter 
defendant grossly misrepresented the amount which he had 
paid into the corporation, insisting that he had paid into 
the corporation approximately ten times the amount which 
he had actually so paid. Plaintiff took exception to these 
misrepresentations and reaffirmed his desire to exercise his 
option upon the basis specified in the option agreement. In 
his letters of December 14, 1936, and February 3, 1937, de-
fendant denied that the amount that he had actually invested 
in the corporation had anything to d:, with the exercise of 
the option thereby repudiating the terms of the option agree-
ment. In the first of said letters he stated 'My books speak 
for themselves' indicating that he considered the parties 
bound by the figures shown by the books. tn the second of 
said letters, he repudiated the figures shown by said books. 
The only conclusion that can be' drawn . from the admitted 
facts is that defendant, through fraudulent representati9llS, 
endeavored to gain an unconscionable advlintageover plain-
tiff either by persuading plaintiff to refrain from exercising 
a valuable option or by obtaining fromplaintlff thousanqs 
of dollars to which defendant was not entitled' in the event 
that plaintiff did exercise said option.'. In any event, the1ln-
contradicted evidence shows that defendant wholly ,failed· to . 
furnish plaintiff with accurate informaticnat any time,ruid . 
under our view of the implied terms of the option agreement;' 
the life of the option was thereby extended at least'to/{nd 
including the time of the sale as found by the trial court. ";('·'1 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied November 
4, 1943. 
